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Abstract
We propose a polynomial-time attack on the hHB protocol, showing
that the protocol does not attain the security it claims. Our attack is
based on the attack introduced in [2].
1 Introduction
In the modern era of cryptography, researchers have struggled with finding low-
cost cryptographic primitives suitable for simplistic hardware environments such
as RFID tags and low-power/cost devices. A popular source of inspiration is
the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, which has roots in machine
learning theory but now has gained a lot of popularity among cryptographers.
The LPN problem is strongly related to the problem of decoding random linear
codes, which probably is the most important problem in coding theory. Being
supposedly hard, LPN plays an important role in post-quantum cryptography
in contrast to classic number theoretic problems. LPN consists of very basic
arithmetic operations and is therefore a perfect fit for light-weight cryptography.
The first ’real’ cryptographic construction based on LPN was the Hopper-
Blum (HB) protocol [5] – a minimalistic protocol being secure in a passive attack
model. Juels and Weis [6], and Katz and Shin [7] proposed a modified protocol,
HB+, which aimed to be secure also in the active attack model by extending HB
with one extra round. However, Gilbert et al. [2] later showed that the HB+
protocol is vulnerable to active attacks, i.e., man-in-the-middle attacks. Later,
Gilbert et al. [3] proposed a variant of the Hopper-Blum protocol called HB#.
Some of the more recent contributions to LPN-based constructions are a two-
round identification protocol called Lapin, proposed by Heyse et al. [4], and an
LPN-based encryption scheme called Helen, proposed by Duc and Vaudenay
[1]. The Lapin protocol is based on an LPN variant called Ring-LPN, where the
samples are elements of a polynomial ring.
Khoureich proposed in [8] a new version of HB called hHB (harder HB),
which aims to repair susceptibility against GRS attacks. In this paper, we show
that this is not the case.
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2 The hHB protocol
The author of [8] argues that the weakness of HB is due to that the secret x
does not change over time. The hHB protocol is built upon the hypothesis; by
employing a way of (presumably) securely transmitting a secret session value
and letting x take this value, [8] aims to patch this weakness. Once the session
value has been transmitted, the verifier in the hHB protocol runs the standard
HB protocol to verify the tag. The hHB protocol is outlined in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 (hHB protocol)
Tag(s, y) Reader(s, y)
τ
$
← {0, 1}, ξ0
$
← {0, 1}, ξ1
$
← {0, 1}
(τ, ξ0, ξ1)← f
−1
s (α, β, γ, 0
|s|)
(α, β, γ)
←−−−−−−− (α, β, γ)← fs(τ, ξ0, ξ1, 0
|s|)
θ ← ξτ θ ← ξτ
p0 ← θ
|s| p0 ← θ
|s|
(Repeat k times)
τ
$
← {0, 1}, ξ0
$
← {0, 1}, ξ1
$
← {0, 1}
(τ, ξ0, ξ1)← f
−1
s (α, β, γ, pi−1)
(α, β, γ)
←−−−−−−− (α, β, γ)← fs(τ, ξ0, ξ1, pi−1)
xi ← ξτ xi ← ξτ
pi−1 ← x1x2 . . . (xi)
|s|−i+1 pi−1 ← x1x2 . . . (xi)
|s|−i+1
(Repeat r times)
x← x1x2 . . . xk x← x1x2 . . . xk
b
$
← {0, 1}k
b
−−−−−−−−→
a
←−−−−−−−− a
$
← {0, 1}k
ν ← Berǫ
z ← a · x⊕ b · y ⊕ ν
z
−−−−−−−−→ Verify a · x⊕ b · y = z
The function used by the reader to transmit session values τ, ξ0, ξ1,
fs(λ1, λ2, λ3, pi)→ (α, β, γ) (1)
is defined in Algorithm 1. Similarly, the inverse function used by the tag to
decode session values τ, ξ0, ξ1,
f−1s (α, β, γ)→ (λ1, λ2, λ3, pi) (2)
is given in Algorithm 2.
3 The attack
We will now proceed with describing our attack. We use a method very similiar
to that of [2].
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Algorithm 1 (function fs)
Input:
λ1, λ2, λ3 ∈ {0, 1},
pi ∈ {0, 1}
k
Output:
Triple (α, β, γ)
c1
$
← {0, 1}k, t1 ← c1 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ λ11
c2
$
← {0, 1}k, t2 ← c2 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ λ22
c3
$
← {0, 1}k, t3 ← c3 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ λ33
if λ1 ⊕ λ2 ⊕ λ3 = 0 then4
return ((c3, t3), (c1, t1), (c2, t2))5
else6
return ((c2, t2), (c3, t3), (c1, t1))7
Algorithm 2 (function f−1s )
Input:
Triple (α, β, γ)
Output:
λ1, λ2, λ3 ∈ {0, 1},
(c1, t1)← α, (c2, t2)← β, (c3, t3)← γ1
λ1 ← c1 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ t12
λ2 ← c2 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ t23
λ3 ← c3 · (s⊕ pi)⊕ t34
if λ1 ⊕ λ2 ⊕ λ3 = 0 then5
return (λ2, λ3, λ1)6
else7
return (λ3, λ1, λ2)8
3.1 Determining secret y
The tag sends the following
a · x⊕ b · y ⊕ ν = z
The verifier checks if the following is satisfied
a · x⊕ b · y =? z,
which is expected to be true for r·E (ν = 0) = r·ǫ of the r samples. If the number
of correct equations are above some threshold, the verifier accepts. Otherwise
the verifier rejects.
First, we ignore the x vector. By intercepting the communication between
the tag and the verifier, we are able to perturbe the interchanged bits. To
determine the value of bit of y at index i, we run the following steps.
1. Let the tag and verifier exchange the session value. For now, this is ig-
nored.
2. When the tag sends b, we flip the ith bit. So,
b′i ← bi ⊕ 1.
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3. Then, we let the tag and verifier run the r steps. If the reader returns
accept, then the bit yi is very likely to be 0. Naturally, we may amplify
the probability of a correct guess by re-running the procedure for the same
bit bi.
4. By repeating for all k bits, we can determine the secret value y.
3.2 Determining secret s
The second stage of the attack aims to determine the secret vector s. In the
very first step of exchanging the session value p0 is always 0
|s], which is the
key to our exploit. To determine the value of bit of s at index j, we run the
following steps.
1. In the first step of the session-value exchange, flip the jth bit in c1. As a
result, we have
λ1 ← (c1 ⊕ δj) · s⊕ t1. (3)
where δj is a vector with 1 on index j and all-zero on the remaing indices.
Hence,
λ1 ←
{
λ1 if sj = 0,
λ1 ⊕ 1 if sj = 1.
Applying the same procedure to c2 and c3, we are able to conditionally
flip also λ2 and λ3.
2. If the two values satisfy ξ0 = ξ1 (which is true with probability
1
2 ), then x
will be perturbed at position 0, i.e., x0 ← x0⊕ 1. Everything else remains
the same.
3. When the tag is verfied against the reader, we set the jth bit of a to always
be 1. Hence, the tag will compute
z ←
{
a · x⊕ b · y ⊕ ν if sj = 0,
a · x⊕ b · y ⊕ ν ⊕ φ if sj = 1.
(4)
where P (φ = 1) = 12 . So, if sj = 1, then the reader will output reject with
probability 12 . Running the procedure a polynomial number of times for
the same index j will give a good estimate of sj .
Implementation of hHB and the MITM attack can be found at [9].
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